Seventh Circuit Review
Volume 13
Issue 1 Seventh Circuit Review Fall 2017

Article 9

5-2017

Selling the Footlong Short: How Consumers Inch Toward
Satisfaction in Costly Food Class Action Litigation
Erica A. Burgos

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Food and Drug Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Erica A. Burgos, Selling the Footlong Short: How Consumers Inch Toward Satisfaction in Costly Food
Class Action Litigation, 13 Seventh Circuit Rev. 259 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/9

This Class Action Law is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly
Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

: Selling the Footlong Short: How Consumers Inch Toward Satisfactio

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

SELLING THE FOOTLONG SHORT: HOW
CONSUMERS INCH TOWARD SATISFACTION IN
COSTLY FOOD CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
ERICA A. BURGOS
Cite as: Erica A. Burgos, Selling the Footlong Short: How Consumers Inch Toward
Satisfaction in Costly Food Class Action Litigation, 13 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 259 (2017),
at https://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/sites/ck/files/public/academics/jd/7cr/v13/burgos.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
Chances are, if you have ever purchased an item, you are among
the many unnamed members of a litigation class action lawsuit.
According to a report published in March 2017 by the Perkins Coie
Food Litigation Group, the food and beverage industry has become a
top target for class actions and individual lawsuits, with nearly 10
class action filings in Illinois, and over 140 filings nationwide, in 2016
alone.1 The uptick in consumer fraud lawsuits involving food and
drink means more money for lawyers, but has left consumers with
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Technology; Member of Chicago-Kent Moot Court Honor Society (2016‒2017);
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2010.
1
David T. Biderman, Julie L. Hussey, Charles C. Sipos, Food Litigation 2016
Year in Review: A Look Back at Key Issues Facing Our Industry, at
https://dpntax5jbd3l.cloudfront.net/images/content/1/7/v2/171826/2017-Food
-Litigation-YIR-FINAL-2.pdf (Mar. 28, 2017) (finding the number of food class
action lawsuits filed each year has significantly increased since 2008, with California
remaining the favored jurisdiction with over 60 cases filed; however, Illinois remains
popular with just under 10 actions filed in 2016).
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little relief.2 In many states, lawyers have found that vague laws on
unfair and deceptive practices are conducive to extracting large
settlements from food companies. Whether plaintiffs are seeking
monetary relief for being purposefully misled, or simply hoping to call
out businesses for their puffery; attorneys are undoubtedly the real
victors.
This Article evaluates the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re
Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practice Litigation
to explore the effects of excessive attorney fee awards on consumer
fraud class actions, and to determine how, if at all, food litigation
could be more equitable to consumers. Part I will explain the evolution
of class actions, which eventually culminated in the passage of more
defined fairness standards. Part II will discuss current trends in food
and drink class action litigation. Part III will focus on In re Subway
Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practice Litigation,
highlighting how courts can underestimate the value of injunctive
relief in light of exorbitant attorney’s fees. Part IV will suggest
limitations and guidelines the legal community should consider in the
wake of interminable food marketing class action lawsuits.
RISE OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT
The class action lawsuit as it exists today is mainly a product of
statutes and rules. The origin can be traced to England’s courts of
chancery.3 In the 12th century, England allowed litigation on behalf of
2

Settlement Agreement, Guoliang Ma, et al. v. Harmless Harvest, Inc., No.
2:16-cv-07102-JMA-SIL. Available at: https://www.foodlitigationnews.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/12/2017/05/Ma-et-al.-v.-Harmless-Harvest-Inc.-SettlementAgreement.pdf. (proposing that while the makers of Harmless Coconut Water would
engage in product label reviews, attorney’s fees would be awarded in the amount of
$575,000); see also Birbrower v. Quorn Foods, Inc., No.2:16-cv-01326-DMG (C.D.
Cal. dismissed Sept. 11, 2017) (proposing a settlement whereby Quorn would no
longer market their products as being made from mushrooms or truffles but class
counsel would receive over half the settlement fund, $1.35 million).
3
Raymond B. Marcin, Searching for the Origin of Class Action, 23 CATH. U.L.
REV. 515, 517 (1974) (“All trace their origins, however to the unwritten practice of
English Chancery at a time before the adoption of our own judicial system.”).
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villages and parishes with an 1125 writ of Henry III to the archbishop
of Canterbury, which stated, “according to our law and custom of the
realm . . . villages and communities . . . ought to be able to prosecute
their pleas and complaints in our courts and in those of others through
three or four of their number.”4
Early examples of group or class litigation include a 12th century
case, Master Martin Rector of Barkway v. Parishioners of
Nuthampstead.5 Nuthahampstead chapel was once an independent
church, but it eventually became a member of the church of Barkway.6
After merging with the Barkway church, a dispute arose about the
rector receiving a payment of tithes in return for his services.7 This
dispute could be viewed as a religious class action, related to how
much ministerial service could be bought with local tithes.8
Furthermore, a 14th century case identified as Discart v. Otes is an
example of a judicially created class action.9 In this case, which
concerned currency used in the Channel Islands, the justices decided
that instead of ruling, they would pass the matter on to the King’s
Council, so that Discart and all others with similar claims could
receive a single, binding judgment.10 This created a new type of suit,
the “Bills of Peace,” whereby one person sued in the hopes of
resolving the matter in favor of themselves and other similarly situated
persons.11 Alas, the class action was born.

4

Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes
of Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687, 690 (1997).
5
Susan T. Spence, Looking Back . . . In a Collective Way: A Short History of
Class Action Law, ABA BUSINESS LAW SECTION, (July/Aug. 2002,
https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2002-07-08/spence.html .
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
A tithe is one-tenth part of something, generally produce or personal income,
set apart and paid as a contribution to a religious organization.
9
Marcin, supra note 3, at 521-23.
10
Id. at 521.
11
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1297, 1326 (1932) (noting that one concern about consolidating many suits into
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A. Class Actions in the United States
In the mid 19th century, the Supreme Court promulgated Federal
Equity Rule 48, which expressly provided for “group representative
litigation.”12 While this new codification allowed cases involving
numerous parties to proceed on a representative basis, the rule was
clear that the judgment of the court had no binding effect on absent
class members.13 Eleven years later, the Supreme Court ignored Rule
48’s closing remarks and held that a judgment in a representative suit
did indeed bind absent class members.14
Early in the 20th century, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.15 Included in these rules was Rule 23, which still
regulates class action lawsuits today.16 It was not until 1966, however,
that the Supreme Court advisory committee amended Rule 23 to
explicitly provide that class action judgments would bind all members
of the class who did not opt out of the suit.17
Under Rule 23, plaintiffs seeking to proceed under a class action
must plead and prove: (1) an adequate class definition, (2)
ascertainability, (3) numerocity, (4) commonality, (5) typicality, and
(6) adequacy.18 Additionally, plaintiffs must demonstrate that separate
one hearing was the “crowding and confusion in the courtroom if each party had
their own lawyer”).
12
Nikita Malhotra Pastor, Equity and Settlement Class Actions: Can There Be
Justice for All in Ortiz v. Fibreboard, AM. U. L. REV. 49, NO. 3, 773, 785 (February
2000).
13
Id. at 785 n.63.
14
See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (1853) (holding “[f]or
convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a
portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all
of them the same as if all were before the court”).
15
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective September 16, 1938, govern
civil proceedings in United States district courts.
16
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
17
For comparison of the old and new versions of Rule 23, see 39 F.R.D. 69,
94-98 (1966).
18
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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adjudications will create a risk of decisions that are inconsistent with
or dispositive of other class members’ claims, declaratory or injunctive
relief is appropriate based on the defendant’s acts with respect to the
class generally, or that common questions predominate and a class
action is superior to individual actions.19
As such, class actions were intended to do more than simply
provide a manageable way to deal with numerous plaintiffs; the
primary purpose was to increase the efficiency and economy of
litigation.20 Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that class actions
provide an opportunity for people with individually insignificant
claims to band together and seek relief.21 As civil rights leaders,
environmentalists, and consumer advocates began utilizing this useful
procedural litigation device, modern class action case law and Rule 23
became increasingly important.
B. Protecting Consumers Under the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005
After the 1980s and 1990s, the wave of mass litigation in
asbestos, lead, and dangerous drugs began to wind down. Tort-reform
laws capped the damages plaintiff could obtain, and new heightened
pleading standards made it harder to bring deficient lawsuits.22 As
such, plaintiff’s lawyers set their sights on a new profit-making target:
consumer-fraud class action litigation. Consumer-fraud cases were
relatively easy to file and class action lawyers had a plethora of
plaintiffs at their disposal because millions of people purchase and
consume products every day. However, class members have yet to

19

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
See General Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 148 (1982).
21
See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980) (stating that
class actions serve not only to protect the defendant from inconsistent obligations,
but protect the interests of absentees while providing a convenient and efficient
means of settling similar lawsuits).
22
John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and
Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1030(2002).
20
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recover grand sums through these lawsuits, even though the attorneys
continue to receive big payouts.
Looking to cash in quick, class action lawyers began filing
consumer-fraud suits in waves.23 In order to combat this uptick in
filings, business groups and tort reform supporters lobbied for more
legislation to restrict class action lawsuits.24 These actions led to the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), which placed large
class-action lawsuits in federal court, removing them from historically
more receptive state courts.25 Interestingly, while business groups
bogged down by excessive consumer-fraud cases urged this reform,
CAFA itself claimed to protect consumer class members from
excessive attorney’s fees.26 In part, CAFA intended to curtail attorneys’
abilities to tie their fee awards to the nominal value of coupons made
available to a settlement class.27 Where coupons provided the only
basis for relief, the portion of attorney’s fees awarded to class counsel
would be based on the value that the class members receiving the
coupons redeemed, rather than the face value of all coupons issued.28
Thus, attorney’s fees are not based on the recovery by the class, rather,
they are “based upon the amount of time class counsel reasonably
expended working on the action.”29

23

See Jeckle v. Crotty LLP, 85 P. 3d 931 (Wash. App. Div. 3 2004) (alleging
that a physician engaged in consumer fraud rather than malpractice where he
advertised his own weight-loss drugs to his patients).
24
William Branigin, Congress Changes Class Action Rules, WASHINGTON
POST, (Oct. 1, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A326742005Feb17.html.
25
Id.
26
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 stat. 4 (Feb. 18, 2005)
§2. (finding that “Class members often receive little or no benefit from class actions,
and are sometimes harmed, such as where counsel are awarded large fees, while
leaving class members with coupons or other awards of little or no value.”)
27
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14, 30 (2005)
28
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 stat. 4 (Feb. 18,
2005) §1712.
29
28 U.S.C §1712(b)(1).
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Despite this commendable language, neither federal nor state
courts have changed the way they approach class action lawsuits.
Many courts continue to approve coupon-based class action
settlements, without a heightened level of scrutiny.30 Moreover, federal
courts considering settlements post-CAFA have often assumed that the
standards remained the same.31 Despite courts’ hesitancy to view class
actions differently post-CAFA, courts have used it in evaluating
requested attorney’s fees.32 Even still, while CAFA may have helped
streamline a method for calculating attorney fee awards, the legislation
did little to quell the number of consumer-fraud based class action
cases. Instead, savvy class action lawyers have turned their attention
toward less regulated areas, such as food and drink advertising.
CURRENT TRENDS IN FOOD AND DRINK CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Over the last decade, the number of consumer fraud class actions
filed has skyrocketed. The nationwide filings for 2016 were nearly
forty-seven percent higher than in 2012.33 Undoubtedly, part of the
increase is caused by consumers’ growing desire for transparency.34
For instance, the public has grown leery of food and other products

30

See Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 55-64 (D.D.C.
2010) (holding that though coupon settlements “pose a particular risk of unfairness
and unreasonableness,” no additional scrutiny is called for by §1712(e)).
31
See In re Tyson Foods, Inc., No. RDB-08-1982, 2010 WL 1924012 (D. Md
2010) (approving coupons for Tyson products to settle a false advertising class
action without any mention of CAFA).
32
See True v. American Honda Motor Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1077 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (finding that “while the lodestar method of awarding fees is permissible
under CAFA, the Court . . . is particularly wary of using the lodestar . . . where the
benefit achieved for the class is small and the lodestar award is large”).
33
Supra note 1.
34
The 2016 Label Insight Transparency ROI Study, LABEL INSIGHT (Oct. 18,
2017), https://www.labelinsight.com/Transparency-ROI-Study (A 2016 consumer
study found that forty percent of consumers said they would switch to a new brand if
it offered more product transparency.).
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that are advertised as “natural.”35 As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys have
rushed in to aid disgruntled consumers. Although these consumer class
action lawsuits were based upon a number of different issues, it was
not until the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC. v.
Concepcion, which upheld a company’s right to enforce contracts
limiting consumers’ ability to band together in class actions lawsuits,
that food-based class actions became even more appealing.36
A. All Natural and Healthy Claims
The first wave of food class action litigation focused on marketing
that claimed food products were “natural,” “nutritious,” or contained
“nothing artificial.” Generally, the claims argued that the products
contained some synthetic ingredient or that the production process
rendered the product no longer natural. In one notable case, a judicial
panel in Missouri consolidated dozens of suits, all of which alleged
that Coca-Cola Simply Orange, Minute Maid Pure Squeezed, and
Premium orange juices deceived consumers into thinking that the
juices were 100% pure.37 Despite labels touting that the juices were
“100% Pure Squeezed,” plaintiffs claimed that the addition of added
flavorings, including orange essence oils, made the labels deceptive to
consumers.38 More specifically, plaintiffs sought to certify classes of
purchasers of Coca-Cola orange juice products, asserting that CocaCola failed to disclose its use of added flavors in these products.39
Such omissions, plaintiffs claimed, deceived consumers into buying

35

Id. (finding that more than half of the people surveyed felt they had to use
their own definition of “healthy” rather than the label itself)
36
563 U.S. 333, 357 (2011).
37
Emily Field, Judge Unsure On Orange Essence Oil in Coke Juice MDL,
LAW 360 (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/758539.
38
Id.
39
In re Simply Orange Orange Juice Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation,
No. 4:12-md-02361-FJG, 2017 WL 3142095, at *1 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 2017).
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these products at premium prices.40 And while the court did certify the
class, the outcome is still pending.41
Disputes arising over broad, undefined nutritional claims provided
another avenue for litigation. Even where the labels themselves did not
assert nutritional claims, creative lawyers argued that the images in
commercials and on product packaging could be interpreted as
purposefully misleading and deceptive to consumers. In 2012, one
California mother filed a lawsuit alleging that she was surprised to
find that Nutella had little to no nutritional value, despite TV
commercials touting quality ingredients.42 The commercial further
claimed that moms could use Nutella “to get [the] kids to eat healthy
foods.”43 Although the lawsuit was met with much ridicule, the judge
ultimately sided with the mother, finding that Nutella would need to
change its marketing campaign and also modify its front labels to
indicate the fat and sugar content of each jar.44
In 2016, consumers filed a a false advertising lawsuit against
Krispy Kreme, alleging that the company’s donut fillings lacked
essential vitamins and nutrients because the filling did not contain real
fruit.45 The case was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice;
however, plaintiff’s counsel still maintained that Krispy Kreme did not
provide an ingredient lists for its doughnuts and had they done so,
consumers would have known that the products did not contain the
premium ingredients Krispy Kreme led customers to believe were in

40

Id.
Id.
42
Laurent Belsie, Nutella Settles Lawsuit. You Can Get $20, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Apr. 27, 2012) at https://www.csmonitor.com/Business/neweconomy/2012/0427/Nutella-settles-lawsuit.-You-can-get-20.
43
Id.
44
Ryan Jaslow, Nutella Health Claims Net $3.05 Million Settlement in Classaction Lawsuit, CBS NEWS (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nutellahealth-claims-net-305-million-settlement-in-class-action-lawsuit/ .
45
Saidian v. Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., No. 2-16-cv-08338-SVW, 2017
BL 78889, at *1 (C.D. Cal filed Feb. 27, 2017).
41
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the doughnuts.46 In yet another lawsuit, the plaintiff argued that Gerber
Puffs’ labels were false and misleading because they depicted fruits
and vegetables though the product itself contained no real fruits or
vegetables.47
The spike in outlandish claims is partially due to the Food and
Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) inability to define “natural.”48 Current
FDA policy states that “natural” means “nothing artificial or synthetic
has been included in, or has been added to, a food that would not
normally be expected to be in the food.”49 After a request from two
federal judges and petitions from consumers and businesses, the FDA
began accepting public comments on how to define “natural.”50
Initially, the closing period was May 10, 2016; however, the FDA
extended the deadline for filing public comments to April 26, 2017.51
Consumers, food producers, and plaintiffs’ attorneys alike await a
statement by the FDA, which could either fuel new litigation or lead to
additional dis missals.
B. Slack Fill Claims
Many lawyers are claiming consumers are getting less than they
bargained for when they get more packaging than product. These types
46

Richard Craver, False Advertising Lawsuit Against Krispy Kreme
Voluntarily Dismissed, JOURNAL NOW (Apr. 27, 2017),
http://www.journalnow.com/business/business_news/local/false-advertising-lawsuitagainst-krispy-kreme-voluntarily-dismissed/article_ec3d74be-1b15-5b2f-a1e3921bf71007ff.html.
47
Henry v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 15-cv-02201-HZ, 2016 BL 125480, at *1
(D. Or. Apr. 18, 2016).
48
Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions,
Definitions of Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid,
and Cholesterol Content of Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2, 302, 2, 407 (Jan. 6, 1993).
49
Id.
50
See FDA Request for Comments re the “Use of the Term ‘Natural’ in the
Labeling of Human Food Products,” 80 Fed. Reg. 69, 905 (proposed Nov. 12, 2015).
51
See Use of the Term “Healthy” in the Labeling of Human Food Products;
Request for Information and Comments; Extension of Comment Period, 81 Fed.
Reg. 96, 404 (proposed Dec. 30, 2016).

268
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/9

10

: Selling the Footlong Short: How Consumers Inch Toward Satisfactio

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

of claims are known as “slack fill” litigation.52 FDA regulations
already restrict the use of useless slack-fill. Extra room in the
packaging is allowed only when it serves a specific purpose, such as to
protect the content of the package, a required component of the
manufacturing process, or is the result of inevitable product settling.53
However, these guidelines have not prevented lawyers from actively
seeking out packages that may contain unnecessarily unfilled space.
Courts have already dismissed many slack fill lawsuits.54 Judges
determined that a consumer need only read the number of ounces or
the quantity count on the packaging to determine the amount of
product they are actually purchasing.55 Despite many courts’ view that
the reasonable consumer should simply read the packaging, some food
producers have acknowledged their customers’ dissatisfaction and
have offered coupons or other incentives to appease the public.56
C. Deception Claims
Apart from attacking the nutritional value or the slack fill of a
product, lawyers are zeroing in on broader deceptions allegedly taking
place. Coffee companies, like Starbucks, have been accused of tricking
consumers into thinking they were getting more coffee than they were
receiving because the cups were not filled to the brim.57 Another
lawsuit against the maker of Tito’s Vodka alleged the brand’s

52

Bob Fiedler, Slack Fill: Reducing Risks and Improving Bottom Line Profits,
CHAINANYLTICS (June 2, 2014), http://www.chainalytics.com/slack-fill-reducingrisks-improving-bottom-line-profits/.
53
See 21 C.F.R. §100.100.
54
See Bush v. Mondelez Int’l, Inc. No. 16-cv-02460, 2016 WL 5886886, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2016).
55
Id. at *3; see also Fermin v. Pfizer, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 3d 209 (E.D.N.Y.
2016).
56
See Complaint, Wurtzburger v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, No. 1:16-cv-08186
(S.D.N.Y.) (filed Sept. 29, 2016 and removed to federal court from the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, Duchess County).
57
See Strumlauf v. Starbucks Corp., 192 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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advertisements misled consumers into believing that the vodka was
handmade in an “old fashioned pot.”58
In 2016, lawyers filed dozens of class action lawsuits against
Parmesan cheese producers and distributors.59 These cases were
consolidated and transferred to the Northern District of Illinois.60 In In
re 100% Grated Parmesan, the lawsuits did not assert any physical
injury.61 Instead, plaintiffs argued they had been deceived by cheese
packaging labels that claimed it contained “100% Grated Parmesan
Cheese.”62 In reality, the products contained anywhere from 2% to 8%
of the food additive cellulose; lawyers claimed the ads intentionally
misled consumers into believing each product was made of nothing
but cheese.63 As of August 24, 2017, District Court Judge Feinerman
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding the descriptions on
the labels were ambiguous, not deceptive. The court explained that a
reasonable consumer should “still suspect that something other than
cheese might be in the container.”64 Regardless of the specific claim
being made, food and beverage class action litigation has continued to
rise, and shows no signs of stopping.

58

See Steven Trader, Vodka Drinkers Seek Cert. in Tito’s ‘Handmade’ False
Ad Suits, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/745073/vodkadrinkers-seek-cert-in-tito-s-handmade-false-ad-suits.
59
Glenn G. Lammi, Food Court Follies: Judge Grates Parmesan-Cheese
Multidistrict Litigation, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2017), at:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2017/08/31/food-court-follies-judge-gratesparmesan-cheese-multidistrict-litigation/#6ec172c344af .
60
In re 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese Marketing and Sales Practices
Litigation, No. 16 C 5802, 2017 WL 3642076, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2017).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 2; see Lydia Mulvany, The Parmesan Cheese You Sprinkle on Your
Penne Could Be Wood, Bloomberg, at:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-16/the-parmesan-cheese-yousprinkle-on-your-penne-could-be-wood (Feb. 16, 2016).
64
In re Parmesan, at *7.
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EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXCESSIVE ATTORNEY’S
FEES AND LACK OF CONSUMER TRUST IN IN RE SUBWAY FOOTLONG
SANDWICH MARKETING AND SALES PRACTICE LITIGATION
Many food and beverage class action lawsuits are arguably
insubstantial; however, many claims genuinely important to
consumers end up getting dismissed because the benefit to class
counsel is disproportionately high in comparison to the value provided
to class members. But, even when courts dismiss cases or refuse to
certify classes, many companies opt to privately settle, often securing
hundreds of thousands of dollars for the attorneys.65 For instance, in In
re Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practice
Litigation, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to
certify the class, determining that these consolidated class actions
should have been “dismissed out of hand.”66 The Seventh Circuit
considered three claims in the case: a standing claim, a class
certification claim, and a settlement approval claim.67 For the purposes
of this Article, only the last two claims are discussed. Understanding
the relationship between exorbitant class action attorney’s fees and
consumer dissatisfaction requires a description of both the lower court
and appellate court’s discussion of the issues.

65

Lisa A. Rickard, Litigation Against Food Companies is Increasing, But Who
Benefits? FOODDIVE (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.fooddive.com/news/litigationagainst-food-companies-is-increasing-but-who-benefits/436988/.
66
In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practices Litig., 869
F.3d 551, 557 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832
F.3d 718, ,724 (7th. Cir. 2016))
67
Id.
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A. The District Court
In January 2013, an Australian teenager photographed his Subway
Footlong sandwich and uploaded it to Facebook.68 The image showed
that his foot-long sandwich was only eleven inches long.69 The post
went viral, and shortly thereafter lawyers began investigating potential
consumer protection claims against Doctor’s Associates, the parent
company of Subway.70 In the same year, the named plaintiffs and their
counsel filed complaints in several different courts, each alleging that
Subway unfairly and deceptively marketed its sandwiches resulting in
each plaintiff receiving less food than he or she had bargained for.71
Thereafter, Subway requested that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation transfer the individual actions to a single district for
consolidation. However, while waiting for the panel to agree to the
request, the parties agreed to mediation.72 During this time, the parties
engaged in initial informal discovery which led the plaintiffs to
recognize the difficulties of obtaining class certification on claims for
monetary damages and as such, decided to seek only injunctive
relief.73 While the Panel had agreed to consolidate the cases in one
district, the parties continued to attend mediation sessions; by March
2014 the parties had agreed to a settlement.74
As part of the settlement, Subway agreed that for a period of four
years, it would engage in a number of inspection measures designed to
ensure that the Subway loaves were at least twelve inches long.75
Additionally, Subway agreed to post notices in stores, and on its
68

In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practices Litig., 316
F.R.D. 240, 242 (E.D. Wis. 2016), rev’d 869 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2017) (hereafter
referred to as “Subway 1”).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 243.
74
Id.
75
Id.
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website, informing consumers of the possibility of shorter loaves of
bread.76
Presented before the district court were the plaintiffs’ motion for
final approval of a settlement, class counsel’s motion for attorneys’
fees, and an incentive award for the named plaintiffs.77 Though the
court had preliminarily approved the settlement, unrepresented
objector Theodore Frank, disputed the settlement’s benefit to the
class.78
The district court first considered whether the total value of the
settlement, $525,000 plus the value of the injunction, was
reasonable.79 The court found that it was, given that the plaintiffs
could not likely recover more than that amount.80 Despite the
reasonableness, the objector argued that the monetary component of
the settlement should be allocated to the named and absent class
members, rather than just to the named plaintiffs and the class
counsel.81 However, the court determined that this was an impractical
request, considering the costs of informing the class members of the
settlement, processing the claims and opt-outs, and distribution of
payment.82 As such, rather than leaving everyone out in the cold, the
court found it reasonable to use the funds to compensate counsel and
the named plaintiffs.83
Additionally, the objector argued that the named plaintiffs and
class counsel were inadequate representatives of the absent class
because the injunctive relief would not actually benefit the class
members.84 Because Subway had already pledged to ensure that all
Subway Footlong sandwiches would be twelve inches, the objector
76

Id. at 244.
Id. at 242.
78
Id. at 245.
79
Id. at 247.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
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Id. at 248.
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argued that the “new” practices would not provide class members with
any benefit they do not already enjoy.85 The court disagreed, stating
that the injunctive relief would now provide a mechanism for actual
enforcement of best practices because class members could enforce
violations by filing motions for contempt sanctions.86
The court next considered whether the settlement only benefitted
future Subway customers. Because many Subway patrons are often
repeat customers, the court found that there is a strong likelihood of
them purchasing a Subway sandwich again in the future.87 This, the
court determined, meant that the injunctive relief did benefit the
current class members as well as future customers.88 Next, the court
disagreed with the objector’s argument that the settlement was unfair
and the named plaintiffs were inadequate class representatives because
the named plaintiffs would each receive a $500 incentive, while all the
absent class member received no monetary relief.89 Instead, the court
argued that because it was not practical to distribute damages to the
class in the first place, awarding $5000 to the named plaintiffs would
not diminish the amount of damages received by the class overall.90
The district court was then left to determine whether the class
counsel’s fees were reasonable.91 Typically, the reasonableness of
attorneys’ fees is calculated by the “lodestar method”.92 Objector
Frank however, did not actually contend that class counsel’s requested
fee exceeded what was reasonable under the lodestar computation.93
Instead, he disputed the reasonableness of counsel appropriating the
85

Id. at 249.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 250.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 252.
92
Id.; the lodestar method calculates the hours reasonably expended on the
case multiplied by a reasonable hour rate. The court may then adjust the fee up or
down based on additional factors.
93
Id.
86
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entire cash value of the settlement for themselves.94 In its analysis of
the issue, the court determined that because the defendant had already
agreed to the fee, the award was reasonable.95 Further, the court noted
that given the modest value of the settlement, any remaining amount
not given to the attorneys could not feasibly be distributed to the class
members.96 As such, the court held that the reasonableness of the fee
should be measured “by the value of the injunctive relief in relation to
what the class members have given up in exchange for that relief.”97
Viewed in this way, the court found that by approving all aspects of
the settlement, including the attorneys’ fees, the injunctive relief
would end the alleged deceptive marketing practices and allow for
consumer class members to hold Subway accountable were they to
violate the settlement terms.98
B. The Seventh Circuit Discussion
After having unsuccessfully objected to the settlement, class
objector Theodore Frank, appealed to the Seventh Circuit.99 In the
opinion, Judge Diane Sykes stated that even though the standard of
review is deferential to the district court, in this case, the district judge
is similar to a fiduciary of the class.100 As a fiduciary, the judge is held
to a higher duty of care and must give the requirements of class
certification “undiluted, even heightened, attention.”101 Because Rule
23(a) requires that class representatives “fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class,” it was essential for the court to consider the

94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practices Litig, 869
F. 3d 551 (7th Cir. 2017) (hereafter referred to as “Subway 2”).
100
Id. at 555 (citations omitted).
101
Id.
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interests of the unnamed class members.102 Judge Sykes recognized, as
many other judges have, that class action settlements often serve to
benefit everyone but the actual class: class counsel seeks a settlement
to get fees and the defendant, such as Subway, supports the settlement
to avoid liability and negative press.103
As such, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the settlement
provided any meaningful benefit to the class.104 Judge Sykes decided
that because the risk of a slightly shorter sandwich was the same
before and after the settlement, the approved settlement was utterly
worthless.105 The court ultimately held that when a class settlement
results in fees for class counsel, but yields no meaningful benefits for
the class, it is “no better than a racket.”106 Even class members’ ability
to hold Subway in contempt of the settlement was deemed to be
worthless.107
Subway 2 is a clear illustration of the effect exorbitant attorneys’
fees have on class action lawsuits. Whether Subway truly engaged in
misleading or deceptive advertising is almost entirely obfuscated by
the fact that the settlement served only to line the pockets of class
counsel. The Seventh Circuit held where a worthless settlement
provides a worthless remedy, thus leaving “zero plus zero [to] equal []
zero,” the case should be dismissed from its advent.108
WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE THE REASONABLE CONSUMER?
The language of Rule 23 clearly states that a primary concern in
class action lawsuits is the fair and adequate protection of the class
interest.109 CAFA’s passage in 2005 was, at least in part, intended to
102

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
Subway II, 869 F. 3d at 556.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 256-57.
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Id. at 256.
107
Id. at 257.
108
Id.
109
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
103
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protect consumer class members from excessive attorneys’ fees.110
And, though the Seventh Circuit acknowledged as much in Subway 2,
it did not provide guidance on what consumers and plaintiffs should
do when class action litigation fails to serve as a proper path to
resolution or when individual lawsuits prove too costly to bare.
A. Do Labels Really Matter?
One of the difficulties plaintiffs face in pursuing deception-based
class action lawsuits is overcoming the “reasonable consumer”
standard.111 In In re 100% Grated Parmesan, the plaintiffs alleged
they had been deceived by the labels on grated parmesan cheese
products.112 The court stated that the deceptiveness of a statement
must be determined by the effect it has on a reasonable consumer.113
This standard “requires a probability that a significant portion of the
general consuming public . . ., acting reasonably in the circumstances,
could be misled.”114 Additionally, the allegedly deceptive act must be
viewed in context with the entire packaging.115 As such, the issue
centered on whether the allegedly misleading labels were ambiguous,
and if so, would any other part of the label dispel a plaintiff’s
confusion.116 If context cleared up the deception, the claim was
defeated, if it did not, then the claim could proceed.117 The court
determined that because the labels were ambiguous and the plaintiffs

110

See CAFA, supra note 26, at (b)(1).
FTC Policy Statement on Deception, FTC.GOV (Oct. 14, 1983),.
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014decep
tionstmt.pdf.
112
In re 100% Parmesan, 2017 WL 3642076, at *1.
113
Id. at *5.
114
Id. (quoting Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016)).
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Id.
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only had to read the ingredient list on the back of the product, the
reasonable consumer was not likely to be misled.118
What the court in In re 100% Grated Parmesan lost sight of was
that every day, consumers are inundated with advertisements on
billboards, in television commercials, and on grocery story displays.
Each advertisement attempts to convince the public to purchase its
product over another. Food and beverage producers know that
successful marketing campaigns affect the average consumer’s
purchases. In 2015, over $560 billion was spent on brand marketing,
and that amount is expected to increase to over $740 billion by
2020.119 More specifically, companies spent roughly $67 billion
dollars on packaging alone in 2015.120
Viewed in this light, it is clear that businesses are heavily invested
in what goes on their packaging. Companies carefully select the
language to be put on their labels in order to distinguish their products
from others. The intention is that the words will draw in the public and
entice them to purchase the goods. The average shopper may have an
idea about the products they are looking for, but often rely on
packaging and branding to make a purchase decision.121 If consumers
were persuaded to purchase products by what a label says, companies
would not invest so much of their budget on packaging and marketing.
As such, consumers “should [not] be expected to look beyond
misleading representations on the front of the box to discover the truth
from the ingredient list in small print on the side of the box.”122 To
expect otherwise encourages companies to continue spending their
marketing dollars on misleading and ambiguous advertisements.

118

Id. at *6.
John Wolfe, Marketing Spend on Brand Activation will top $595 Billion in
2016, ANA (April 19, 2016), http://www.ana.net/content/show/id/39647.
120
Id.
121
David Court, Dave Elzinga, Susan Mulder, and Ole Jorgen Vetvik, The
Consumer Decision Journey, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (June 2009), at
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-sales/our-insights/theconsumer-decision-journey.
122
William v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2008).
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B. The Legal Community Can Make a Difference.
Whether the issue at hand involves food and beverage sales
practices or some other matter, class action litigation is in need of
reform. This Article proposes that, like the the district court in Subway
1, other courts should reassess the value of injunctive relief as it
pertains to food class action litigation.123 In Subway 2, the Seventh
Circuit determined that the injunctive relief proposed by the settlement
was worthless because despite new quality-control measures and the
inclusion of disclaimers in their ads, Subway would never be able to
guarantee that each loaf of bread would always be twelve inches
long.124 Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the district court argued that the
reasonableness of a class counsel’s fee award as well as the settlement
itself cannot and should not always be measured by the size of the
monetary relief to the class members.125 Courts should not be
immediately dissuaded by the amount of class counsel fees but rather
give pause to consider the value of injunctions. Injunctive relief can
“preserve each class member’s right to bring a subsequent action for
monetary damages, either individually or as part of a class action”126
should a defendant breach the terms of the agreement. By elevating the
value of injunctions, plaintiff consumers will maintain at least one
modest way of forcing food companies to examine their practices.
Currently, consumers and producers are still waiting for the FDA
to issue further guidance on what the term “natural” means.127 Other
regulatory agencies should follow suit and provide clarity on common
labeling terms. The more direction provided to companies, the easier it
will be for them to tailor their marketing and advertisements
accordingly. Furthermore, the more narrowly defined the terms, the
easier it will be to differentiate between frivolous and meritorious
food-related claims. Additionally, in light of more recent cases such as
123

Subway I, 316 F.R.D. at 252.
In re Subway II, 869 F.3d 551, 556-57 (7th Cir. 2017).
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the Ninth Circuit’s Gerber Products Co.,128 the FTC should consider
issuing an updated letter of guidance on what it means to deceive a
reasonable consumer. Because it is plausible “that a consumer might
rely on the representation [on the label] . . . without looking at the
ingredients,” 129 the FTC should factor in what a reasonable consumer
relies on in making their purchases.
Finally, Congress should pass the Fairness in Class Action
Litigation Act, which would eliminate many of the no-injury class
actions while also requiring that a majority of the settlement award go
to class members, rather than class counsel.130 This legislation would
“assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members . . . with
legitimate claims” as well as “diminish abuses in class action . . .
litigation that are undermining the integrity of the U.S. legal
system.”131 On March 9, 2017, this bill was passed by the House and
has since been sent to the Senate for review. Should this legislation be
enacted, class action procedures would undergo several substantive
changes.
In an effort to ease any concerns over unmeritorious complaints,
under the new act, a court could not certify a class unless there is a
“rigorous analysis of the evidence.”132 Additionally, the bill would
address several issues relating to attorney’s fee awards. First, it would
delay payment of class counsel’s fees until after the distribution of
monetary recovery to the class.133 Second, rather than tying attorney’s
fee awards to the total amount of the class settlement fund, the awards
would be limited to “a reasonable percentage” of the payments
actually distributed and received by class members.134 Finally, the bill

128

See Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2008).
Thorton v. Pinnacle Foods Group LLC, No. 4:16-CV-00158 JAR, 2016 WL
4073713, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2016).
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would tie the calculation of fees in injunctive classes to the value of
the injunctive relief provided to class members.135
There appears to be no end in sight for class action ligation based
on food and beverage sales and marketing practices; however, rather
than dismissing these cases out of hand, legislators, regulatory
agencies, and courts should work together to develop better methods
of ensuring that these types of lawsuits become more equitable for
both plaintiffs and defendants.

135

Id. at §1718(b)(3).
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